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Traumatic Miscarriage
Beryl W. Stewart*
A TTORNEYS ARE CONFRONTED by an ever increasing amount of
litigation concerning miscarriage occasioned by physical
and physic trauma. The proof and evaluation of the proximate
cause of miscarriage is perplexing. The subject of miscarriage is
not a matter of common knowledge, hence the members of the
jury are not competent to determine, without expert testimony,
whether trauma is the proximate cause of the miscarriage.' To
add to the burden of proof, the courts have not always adhered
to correct medical terminology.2 But it is particularly important
that the correct terms be employed, and expert testimony must
be given by competent authority.
A definition of terms will be necessary to place the discus-
sion on a firm footing. Medical authority has stated:
if a pregnancy is interrupted during the first three months
(a trimester), it is called an abortion. If it occurs during the
second trimester, it is referred to as a miscarriage. If it
occurs during the last trimester, it is referred to as a pre-
mature delivery.3
An abortion produced by trauma is the termination of pregnancy
by an outside force. It causes physical or mental injury to the
prospective mother and physically prevents her from carrying
her pregnancy through to term.
4
Reliable medical authority has stated that the relationship
of miscarriage to external traumatic injury is almost invariably
coincidental.5 That trauma may be the cause of abortion has
been the subject of bitter controversy, due largely to the diffi-
culty of establishing proximate causation with a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty.( Causation as determined by medical
authorities is much more rigid than that employed by the courts.
* B.S., University of Toledo; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
I Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead, 189 Md. 536, 56 A. 2d 706 (1948).
2 2 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 528 (1959).
3 Brooke, In the Wake of Trauma 299-300 (1957).
4 1 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 22 (1959).
5 Culiner, Trauma and the Usual Miscarriage 3 (1960).
6 3 Schweitzer, Proof of Traumatic Injuries 50 (1961).
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TRAUMATIC MISCARRIAGE
The present weight of authority is that physicians cannot readily
tell whether an accident was the proximate cause of a miscar-
riage.7 However, legally sufficient proof is often presented. In
this light, it has been stated that accidental trauma leading to
miscarriage may be of "legal origin." 8
In one careful analysis of 1000 non-criminal abortions, only
one doubtful case could be traced to external trauma or physic
shock.9 During pregnancy the fetus is well protected from trau-
ma and uterine rupture is very rare.'0 External trauma deliv-
ered to the abdomen under ordinary circumstances will not
cause an abortion unless the trauma is of considerable magni-
tude." It is usually only after the abortion has occurred that the
trauma is recalled and special significance ascribed to it. 12 Many
physicians believe that the woman who has aborted searches for
a plausible cause for her unsuccessful pregnancy. Then, remem-
bering a trauma to which she can attribute it, she relieves her
unconscious feeling of guilt at having failed to measure up as a
woman.
13
Often, the uterus may absorb rather severe blows without
damage, but in some situations, even a minor injury may result
in uterine rupture with dire consequences for the fetus.1 4 In
certain instances when the developing fetus has only a fragile
grasp on nature's promise of life to come, trauma to the abdomen
could conceivably be enough to tip the balance. The violence
may produce such damage to the body that the healing of non-
maternal injuries saps the vitality of the maternal organism.
Under these circumstances, there may not be sufficient reserve
to cope with both the pregnancy and the injuries. Then a wise
nature will occasionally relieve the injured mother of the bur-
den of pregnancy. 5
At least three factors must be proved before recovery can
be had for miscarriage caused by trauma: the woman was preg-
7 Jenkins, Gynecological and Obstetrical Aspects of Back Injury, 23 Tenn.
L. Rev. 669 (1955).
8 1 Echlov, Current Medicine For Attorneys 22 (1953).
9 5 Moore, Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia 418 (1960).
1o 5 Id. at 417.
11 Brooke, op. cit. supra n. 3.
12 5 Moore, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 419.
13 1 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 16 (1959).
14 5 Moore, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 417.
15 Brooke, op. cit. supra n. 3.
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nant, that the trauma did in fact occur, and that the woman did
miscarry. 16 Because of the inexactitude of medical science, posi-
tive proof that a specific trauma caused the miscarriage is not
absolutely necessary nor always possible, as we shall see later.
Proof that a woman has missed at least two menstrual periods
and that an examining physician has observed an enlargement
of the uterus is normally sufficient to lead to the conclusion that
the woman was pregnant.' The proof that the trauma occurred
should be a run-of-the-mill experience for the average attorney.
At first blush, too, proof that a woman has miscarried may seem
equally easy to establish. However, in Martin v. Huff Truck
Line,'8 the plaintiff alleged that she was injured in an accident
caused by the defendant's negligence, and that as a result, she
later aborted. The trial court held that she could not recover
since she did not consult a physician when the labor pains ap-
peared. In addition, little testimony was offered that she was
pregnant prior to the accident. However, failure to consult a
physician for labor pains prior to miscarriage is not necessarily
fatal to recovery. In Comeau v. Beck' 9 the defendant's physician
testified that he had grave doubts concerning the plaintiff's preg-
nancy and her subsequent miscarriage. She had not called a
physician at the time of the alleged miscarriage. The plaintiff
offered no medical testimony. The defendant's contention was
that the alleged damage was conjectural and that medical testi-
mony must be introduced to prove that the plaintiff suffered a
miscarriage. The court held that the plaintiff's evidence showing
an injury caused by the accident (a rear-end automobile colli-
sion) was sufficient for recovery of damages. This decision,
however, seems to be limited in its application.
A further problem for the miscarriage action involves the
habitual aborter who aborts following trauma. These habitual
aborters suffer spontaneous abortions from unknown causes. It
is an accepted fact among obstetricians that 20% of all pregnant
women bleed or spot during their pregnancies. Half of these
(10% of all pregnancies) terminate in spontaneous abortions for
one reason or another.20 Most spontaneous abortions are due to
16 5 Cantor, Traumatic Medicine and Surgery for the Attorney 3 (1961).
17 3 Schweitzer, op. cit. supra n. 6.
18 32 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 1947).
19 319 Mass. 17, 64 N. E. 2d 436 (1946).
20 2 Dignam, Trauma (No. 2), 71 (1960).
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defects of the embryo, faults in the implantation process, and
abnormal endocrine influences1.2 In these cases, the burden of
proof is more difficult, since such a history may present a serious
question as to whether a specific trauma or some pre-existing
conditions induced the abortion.
Several factors should be investigated before trauma can be
determined to be the cause of the miscarriage: the health of the
woman before the trauma, the condition of her reproductive or-
gans, the history of her previous pregnancies, the severity and
location of the trauma, and a determination that the fetus was
normal.
22
As an example of a troublesome proof situation, a woman
may pass the corpus of the fetus while answering a call of na-
ture, and thus, the fetus may be lost to scientific investigation.
This again is not necessarily fatal to the action, since generally
it is necessary to have a dilation and curettage (D & C) per-
formed to complete the expulsion and control the bleeding.23
Legal Causation in Traumatic Miscarriage
The Time Factor
In Griffin v. Cascade Theaters Corp.,2 4 a pregnant woman
tripped over a theater advertising sign. She did not fall to the
floor, but was caught by her father-in-law. She received a skin
laceration at the time of the accident. While watching the motion
picture, she suffered from cramps and pains. The pains increased
in severity during the night and she miscarried the following
morning. The trial court held that she was entitled to bring her
action for damages and overruled a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict.
In Pinkney v. Cohn Ins. Co.,25 a pregnant woman was in-
jured when she fell through the floor. The plaintiff was denied
recovery because she did not prove that the fall was the proxi-
mate cause of her miscarriage. She was injured in June and mis-
carried six weeks later. Following her fall she was attended by
her physician, who discovered that she had malaria and that this,
not the fall, caused her miscarriage.
21 Id. at 57.
22 1 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 17 (1959).
23 2 Dignam 61, op. cit. supra n. 20.
24 10 Wash. 2d 574, 117 P. 2d 651 (1941).
25 Supra n. 18.
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These two cases indicate the importance of time in rela-
tion to the miscarriage. Following a trauma, a miscarriage must
occur within a reasonable time (usually within two weeks) or
recovery will be denied.
26
Establishing Medical Causation
Certain problems arise where medical testimony indicates
that the proximate cause of traumatic abortion cannot be deter-
mined absolutely. It is medically impossible to state whether or
not a particular trauma produced a particular miscarriage. In
Ephrem v. Phillips,27 the plaintiff was involved in an automobile
collision. Later she aborted. Her physician testified that the
trauma produced the abortion. He further stated that it is not
medically possible to determine definitely the exact cause of the
abortion. The defendant, in his appeal, contended that the phy-
sician's testimony was conjectural. The court affirmed the plain-
tiff's recovery of damages, declaring that the physician was only
showing the inexactitude of medical science. Inability to prove
absolutely is not synonymous with speculation.
A physician testified in Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant,
28
that in his opinion, there "might" or "could" have been causal
connection between the plaintiff's illness and her premature
childbirth. The plaintiff was a pregnant woman who, accom-
panied by her friends, went to the defendant restaurant to attend
a bridal shower. She ate contaminated food which subsequently
caused violent stomach disorders. She miscarried shortly after-
wards. The court held that the doctor's opinion, based on a med-
ical viewpoint, could hardly be called a mere guess unsupported
by the evidence. In general, trauma cannot be proved to be the
sole cause of miscarriage, but only its probable cause.
In another instance, an intensely nervous woman, who had
miscarried on previous occasions, brought an action in Inter
Ocean Oil Co. v. Marshal2 9 to recover for a miscarriage alleged-
ly due to the heat being shut off by the defendant landlord. The
woman returned from a trip and found her home extremely cold.
She had no place to go, so she stayed. She developed a chill and
later miscarried. Her doctor, a chiropractor, testified in effect
20 Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead, supra n. 1.
27 99 So. 2d 257 (Fla. App. 1957).
28 347 Ill. App. 183, 106 N. E. 2d 731 (1952).
29 166 Okl. 118, 26 P. 2d 399 (1933).
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that he did not know what caused her miscarriage. The trial
court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and remanded for a
new trial, stating that the jury should not be permitted to specu-
late upon or infer when an expert witness refuses to express an
opinion.30
The Effect of Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not
necessarily bar her recovery. Under the doctrine of discovered
peril, a person who discovers another's perilous position in time
to avoid injuring such person by the exercise of ordinary care,
but fails to exercise that care, becomes liable for the other's
injuries proximately resulting from such failure, even though
the other person was himself guilty of contributory negligence.
In Forth Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Capehard3' this doctrine was
unsuccessfully applied, but the plaintiff still recovered. The
plaintiff in this case was the husband, who sought to recover
damages as the result of alleged injuries his wife sustained in
passing over the defendant's track at a public crossing. The
track was under repair at the time of the accident. The track
foreman motioned to her to cross the tracks and in doing so, she
suffered bodily injuries to the extent that her baby was born
dead. The court held the husband had the burden of proving
that his wife was in danger of being injured if she attempted
to cross the tracks, that danger was imminent, and that the rail-
road's section crew foreman realized the danger. The husband
failed to prove these points; nevertheless, he recovered for his
wife's injury under the theory of negligence of defendant for
failure to warn his wife. This was the proximate cause of his
wife's injury. It is interesting to note that the situs of the action
was Texas, where a wife is not emancipated as is the rule in
other states. Her husband must bring the action.
It is common knowledge that a pregnant woman during the
later stages of her pregnancy is prone to acute balancing and
co-ordination problems. In Caspermeyer v. Florsheim Shoe Co.32
a pregnant woman in her seventh month was walking with her
son. She glanced toward her son and fell into an open sidewalk
loading chute, suffering injuries to the extent that her baby was
30 Id. at 402.
31 210 S. W. 2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
32 313 S. W. 2d 198 (Mo. App. 1958).
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born dead. She had looked ahead, but had not seen the opening.
The defendant alleged that she was guilty of contributory negli-
gence according to law. The court held that she was not negli-
gent in looking to her young son's welfare and, noting her con-
dition at the time of the injury, allowed a substantial recovery.
Fright and Mental Anguish
Can a recovery of damages be had where the plaintiff mis-
carries due to fright or mental anguish without a physical trau-
ma? The majority of rulings seem to indicate no. However,
many jurisdictions hold that fright and any slight trauma will be
sufficient basis for compensation for both the fright and the
physical injury.
Emotional excitement and anxiety played a part in a mis-
carriage in Richardson v. Pridmore.33 The plaintiff was two or
three months pregnant when she went on a trip. Upon her re-
turn, she discovered that the apartment manager had changed
the door lock to her apartment and was evicting her. She was
forced to make several trips to the basement to retrieve her
belongings under the landlord's belligerent threats. Shortly after
this upsetting situation, she aborted. The proximate cause of her
abortion was blamed on the emotional excitement and anxiety
coupled with the physical exertion. The court, however, treated
her eviction as an intentional tort, and the miscarriage as a phys-
ical injury.
In Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co.,3 4 a woman ate a portion of
a meal and then discovered that it contained cockroaches due to
the ice cream company's negligence. Although pregnancy was
not involved, she became ill and nauseated. The court held that
she was entitled to recovery even though there was no physical
injury. This decision was one of the first to undermine the an-
cient rule that stated there could be no recovery for mere fright
or physical conditions resulting thereupon.
Another case in which the woman miscarried but suffered
no actual physical violence was in Gulf Refining v. Atchison.3 5
In this case the husband owned certain property which was the
situs of a trespass by the defendant's trucks. The husband
stopped the defendant's truck, and the driver brought two dep-
33 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 217 P. 2d 113 (1950).
34 125 Misc. 835, 211 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1925).
35 196 F. 2d 258 (5th Cir. 1952).
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uty sheriffs to settle the problem. The wife was in the home with
her husband when the deputies arrived. The driver stated that
they had better get the husband and shoot him. The husband
was ordered from the home, but he did not go. Subsequently,
one of the deputies shouted, "Move your wife and kid out of the
way or we'll let you have it through the door." The court held
that the evidence was sufficient to show that the wife was as
much a victim of the employee's threats as was her husband, and
that the wife's concern for the safety of her husband was not the
sole cause of her injuries.
In McCullough v. Orcutt,36 the pregnant woman's husband
was injured in an accident. His wife miscarried allegedly due
to the shock, strain and anxiety caused by her husband's inju-
ries. The court held that there could be no recovery since there
was no physical injury, and the accident itself was not the proxi-
mate cause of the miscarriage.
Adherence to the doctrine of foreseeability, as laid down in
the Palsgraf decision,3 7 is still firmly entrenched in this country.
A later decision 8 emphasizes the durability of the doctrine con-
cerning the unforeseeable plaintiff. A wife sitting in front of her
home witnessed a collision between her husband's automobile
and another. The wife brought a suit against the defendant
alleging that her miscarriage was proximately caused by severe
emotional strain, fright and mental shock. The court sustained
a demurrer to her cause of action. No recovery may be allowed
for mental stress resulting from fear of injury to another.
Legal Remedies for Traumatic Miscarriage
Various legal actions may be based on trauma experienced
by a pregnant woman. Damages for pain and suffering must be
reasonable in all instances. 39 Each case must be considered on
its own facts in determining the reasonableness of the award.
40
The parties plaintiff may be the injured woman, her husband, or
the premature child. The damages which can be claimed by each
are discussed in this section.
36 14 Ill. App. 2d 503, 145 N. E. 2d 109 (1957).
S7 225 N. Y. Supp. 412, 162 N. E. 99 (1928); 59 A. L. R. 1253.
38 Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P. 2d 80 (1958).
39 St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Fox, 359 P. 2d 710, 83 A. L. R. 2d 1318
(Okla. 1961).
40 Hampton v. Rautenstrauch, 338 S. W. 2d 105, 83 A. L. R. 2d 1260 (Mo.
1960).
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Woman Miscarried By Trauma
Even if trauma to the injured woman does not cause an
abortion, she may still recover. In numerous decisions 41 because
of proper medical treatment and physical tenacity, the injured
woman did not actually miscarry. In such cases there may be
recovery for mental anguish resulting from the apprehension
that the child would be born dead or deformed, even though
subsequent events show the fear to be groundless. Such appre-
hension is real and compensable. Needless to say, when a wom-
an does miscarry, she can recover for the physical and mental
suffering and the physical impairment to her health.42 However,
she is not entitled to compensation for childbirth in the normal
manner 43 or for loss of the unborn child.44 By the majority view,
loss of earnings is also compensable to the wife.45
Husband of the Miscarried Woman
The husband may be compensated for the loss of his wife's
services and the loss of consortium and society of his wife,46 for
medical treatments, 47 mental anguish and worry resulting from
his wife's abortion, 48 burial expenses for the stillborn child, 49 and
41 Meeks v. Zimmerman, 223 Ark. 503, 266 S. W. 2d 827 (1954). The injured
woman was confined to the hospital for four days. She suffered what ap-
peared to be labor pains and was in grave danger of miscarriage. In addi-
tion to the physical pains, she suffered mental anguish by reason of this
condition. A damage award of $8,500 was determined not excessive. Accord,
Holmes v. Combs, 120 Ind. App. 331, 90 N. E. 2d 822 (1950); Jordan v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 90 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 1956); Wiley v. Sutphin,
108 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1959); Simmons v. Pierce, 104 So. 2d 258 (La App.
1958); Nomey v. Great American Indemnity Co., 121 So. 2d 763 (La App.
1960); Deshotels v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 132 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1961).
42 Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N. D. Iowa 1960).
43 Morris v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 105 Minn. 276, 117 N. W. 500 (1908).
44 Rephann v. Armstrong, 217 Md. 90, 141 A. 2d 525 (1958).
45 Fox v. Fox, 296 P. 2d 252 (Wyo. 1956); Bologach v. United States, 122
F. Supp. 502 (M. D. Pa. 1954); Kraut v. Cleveland R. Co., 132 Ohio St. 125,
5 N. E. 2d 324 (1936); Hrvatin v. Cleveland R. Co., 69 Ohio App. 499, 44
N. E. 2d 283 (1942); Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A. 2d 789 (1946);
Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1945).
46 Stephens v. Weigel, 336 Ill. App. 36, 82 N. E. 2d 697 (1956); Ruland v.
Zenith Constr. Co., 283 P. 2d 540 (Okla. 1955).
47 Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951);
Sibley v. Wilcox, 125 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 1960).
48 Sibley v. Wilcox, supra n. 48.
49 Norman v. Murphy, 268 P. 2d 178 (Cal. App. 1954). In this action the
husband and wife were allowed burial expenses for their stillborn child as
an incident of their own damages.
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the loss of earnings of his wife.50 The minority view also allows
the husband to sue for the loss of his wife's earnings, and it is
important to note that the minority view is restricted to those
states that have community property laws and where the Mar-
ried Woman's Act has not been enacted. The reasoning of the
minority view is found in Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co. 5
The Child of the Miscarried Woman
Most jurisdictions seem to allow the child who is born alive
to recover for prenatal injuries sustained after the fetus was
viable. 52 However, because of several decisions, the question of
viability seems to be in jeopardy.53 The measure of damages for
prenatal injuries is embraced within three general elements:
compensation for the injury and resulting impairment of body
and mind; compensation for the cost and care necessitated by
the injury and impairment, including the cost of probable future
care; and compensation for the deprivation of normal life ex-
pectancy.
54
50 Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra n. 48.
51 Ibid.
52 Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 111 A. 2d 14
(1955); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334
(1949); Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E. D. S. C. 1960).
53 Sinlder v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A. 2d 93 (1962). The fact that the
child was not viable (that is he was injured during the first trimester) does
not control, as the fetus is regarded as having existence as a separate entity
from the moment of conception. Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N. H. 483, 147 A.
2d 108 (1958). Smith v. Brennan, 31 N. J. 353, 157 A. 2d 497 (1960).
54 Sox v. United States, supra n. 53.
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